Throughout 1980s, the ROC Navy and Sikorsky had discussed terms of bailout agreement that would allow the ROCN the opportunity to obtain the H-60 derivative, when the US congress kept rejecting the export permission of SH-60B/ASW Sea Hawk to Taiwan. Eventually, Taiwan obtained the S-70M/ASW with 60% higher unit price than the earlier S-70C/SAR helicopter. Taiwan received the first three S-70M/ASW helicopters of a planned procurement of 10 on Aug 29, 1991. These Ms are deployed on board 8 Perry-class and 16 Lafayette-class frigates; this costly acquisition quite reflected the tri-lateral conciliation.
As historic trends, Taiwan returns to the Pan-Chinese orbit is just a matter of time. The stronger the unification bond, the feebler the US can use Taiwan as leverage to oppress the rise of China, and the less Taiwan needs purchasing US weapons. For the Reds, the PROC finally understands that conditionally allowing ROC’s arms upgrading, is necessary for Taiwanese switching from anti-unification to natural-unification. Its military might is proved only works for restricting the Taiwanese independence movement, not spontaneous unification, which is popular among 85% populace of the island. Needless to say the Red leaders received fat commissions from Taiwanese defense purchases. For the US, dwarfing Taiwan as an armed protectorate is part of its global domination.
As for Taiwan, its de-facto independence heavily depend on the US. As long as the US keeps supporting Taiwan, the PROC is impossible to merge ROC. So under the ROC’s current vague “no unification, no independence, no war” policy, Taiwanese generally accept postponed unification, via armed autonomy. Furthermore all its politicians, either anti- or pro-independent, regard Uncle Sam as their overlord. Prior to the 2012 Taiwanese presidential election, campaign staff on both sides flew to Washington to kowtow for approval, following the US declared US$ 5.852 billion military sales to Taiwan. It’s little wonder ROC’s déjà vu cycle is constant state of imbalance.
The price of half-hearted defense management efforts is bottomless import: Boeing Vertol B-234MLR, CH-47SD Chinook heavy-lift transport, Hughes 500MD/ASW Defender, Sikorsky S-70C/SAR Bluehawk , S-70M/ASW Seahawk helicopters, the list could go on and on.
Friday, July 13, 2012
Tuesday, July 3, 2012
Nonsense begets nonsense
All the currently CAF operational S-2T Turbo-Trackers were modified from the aging S-2E/Gs of the ASW Group. With the original US$260 million plan for conversion of 25 S-2Es and 7 S-2Gs, 2 Gs were first sent to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for upgrading to the S-2T standards by Northrop Grumman. The maiden flight took place in Jul 1988, and the Turbo-Tracker duo returned to Taiwan in Aug 1991. Additional 25 instead of the planned 32 E/Gs were then converted locally by using retrofit kits supplied by NG.
For the US hungry for dumping its outmoded arms, Taiwan is a dream customer, a compulsive dupe with a bottomless wallet and unconditional dependence on the US. Without putting the utmost US$430 million deal up for competitive bids, their procurement process wasn’t followed to ensure the best aircraft for the best price. Instead of the CAF, actually it was the USN signed the contract with NG. When the latter postponed the first two aircraft delivery from Nov 1989 to Feb 1991, Taiwan was in no position to demand a penalty. NG had never completely delivered the ISS parts, and 3/4 spares it delivered were useless. Before half of the planed 32 aircraft were modified, the first 13 completed S-2Ts had already used up all the received retrofit kits.
S-2Tdeal had wildly gone over budget, and the overrun was out of manageable. Surely this was not the first crude awakening for Taiwan, but with a loose constellation of losers inside the government and outside it, it is difficult to stand up against the inequality with full force. In 1986-91 the number of ROC-US military procurement disputes totaled 792, in average 5% cases were doomed per year. With a low 50% operational ready rate, by blog time only 12-15 vintage S-2Ts fulfill daily combat readiness.
For the US hungry for dumping its outmoded arms, Taiwan is a dream customer, a compulsive dupe with a bottomless wallet and unconditional dependence on the US. Without putting the utmost US$430 million deal up for competitive bids, their procurement process wasn’t followed to ensure the best aircraft for the best price. Instead of the CAF, actually it was the USN signed the contract with NG. When the latter postponed the first two aircraft delivery from Nov 1989 to Feb 1991, Taiwan was in no position to demand a penalty. NG had never completely delivered the ISS parts, and 3/4 spares it delivered were useless. Before half of the planed 32 aircraft were modified, the first 13 completed S-2Ts had already used up all the received retrofit kits.
S-2Tdeal had wildly gone over budget, and the overrun was out of manageable. Surely this was not the first crude awakening for Taiwan, but with a loose constellation of losers inside the government and outside it, it is difficult to stand up against the inequality with full force. In 1986-91 the number of ROC-US military procurement disputes totaled 792, in average 5% cases were doomed per year. With a low 50% operational ready rate, by blog time only 12-15 vintage S-2Ts fulfill daily combat readiness.
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