Curtiss Hawks in the Chinese Great Resistance War

Japanese had held the Chinese in low esteem ever since the 1st Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Among the few Chinese respected by the Japanese, military theorist Jang Bai-Li (蔣百里 1882-1938) was one of them. It was General Jang originated the strategic directorial, which eventually defeated the overpowering enemy in the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1936, this strategy was formalized in the Luoyang Conference in two folds, 1) Switching the expected Japanese invading spearhead from southbound to westbound, at Shanghai, 2) Protracting the war to deplete Japan, at all cost.

As the Chinese strategists had foreseen, their tactics of delay ensnared the invaders in a prolonged and costly battle of attrition on Shanghai. Ever since the Japanese front was diverted into inland, facing huge obstacles and a nearly insuperable supply shortage. Under this steep strategy, even the capital was replaceable if necessary, but the Chinese would not give up Nanking without a good fight.

Though the Chinese efforts to defense Nanking were fragmented and under-resourced, but both their army and air force inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese infantry and unescorted bombers. Before the improved Japanese fighters swept Chinese mixed air flotilla from the skies, the CAF committed the bulk of its Curtiss Hawk II and Hawk III squadrons into stiff resistance: