Do-or-Die of the Chinese Polikarpov

Thought the Japanese tactical sturdiness was admirable, but the question marks in their warfare strategy were many. In retrospect, their fanatic narrow-mindedness untreatably prevented a wise policy-making. Known as the Demon of Manchuria, in his 1950s’ memoir Violence of Showa, the class-A war criminal and Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke pointed out Imperial Japan never had a greater strategic objective in the Sino-Japanese War. It was the Chinese always held the initiative, and the IJA was totally in passive status.

In 1937-38 China desperately needed Wu-Han as her only transit port for urgent evacuating the industrial equipments from coastal area to inland, and achieved this strategic goal by tieing down 370,000 IJA troops in the Battle of Shanghai. Over 90 poorly supplied Chinese divisions were sacrificed in Shanghai, but it sidetracked the enemy spearhead to a disguised dead end. During these valuable 13 months, numerous factories and personnel moved into the home front Sichuan via Wu-Han, for the future counter-offensive. When the invader approached Wu-Han in late 1938, the tri-cities was defended by still light equipped Chinese army, but supported by the regrouped and rearmed Polikarpov fighter squadrons.

Polikarpov were the most numerous fighters in China prior to Pearl Harbor and open American intervention. Since Stalin was anxious to help China to divert Japanese attention away from Siberia, two trade agreements were signed between China and Russia. China agreed to exchange strategic minerals and raw material for Soviet combat planes, artillery and tanks, valued at 50 million dollars. Soon the Soviet equipment poured into China after the Japanese attacks since 1937, three years before the Flying Tigers arrived in China.

This mini series graphically charts Polikarpov I-15bis "Chato", I-15ter "Chika", I-16 Type 10, and Type 17 sub-versions: